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One of the burdens of an atomic age is a continual lag between
problem and solution. No sooner does one manage to cope with the
problems of yesterday than one is faced with the new and even more
pressing problems of today. Planning, zoning, and subdivision control
are no exception to this rule. In just a short time, a minimum of
land-use regulation has been accepted which w ill bring order into the
community; i.e., regulation which, so to speak, w ill keep the pig out
of the parlor. Even these controls would probably shock our grand
fathers; however, in the last several years, planning authorities have
considered even more drastic approaches to the regulation of land use.
Subdivision controls w ill have an important role to play in this process.
The metropolitan building boom goes on at a rapid pace, forcing
municipalities to use subdivision regulations to shape the new urban
growth which is sprouting on the edge of almost every city. It is thought
that a discussion of some of the difficult legal questions which this new
approach to planning w ill bring w ill be of interest.
Since the war, communities have been faced with what some call
galloping suburbanitis. New terms and expressions exist which reflect
the atomic era: metrofission, the exploding metropolis, urban sprawl.
How do subdivision controls fit into this picture ? A little bit of history
w ill be helpful here. Originally, the purpose of subdivision regulation
was to make more convenient and certain the conveyance of land and
the recording of titles to land. It is well known that the legal descrip
tion of land can often be very complicated. The legal description is
often called the metes-and-bounds description because it describes the
plot in terms of boundaries. It may go something like this—“beginning
at a point 100 yards from where the bear crossed the river, down the
Old Granny Road to where the mill used to stand,” and so on. This
may be an exaggeration, but there are worse examples. These de
scriptions may often be very difficult to trace on a map. They are
very cumbersome to use in conveyancing if for no other reason than
that errors are possible when the description is too complex and too
complicated.
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The original purpose of subdivision regulation was to permit the
subdivider to divide land into lots and blocks. This technique is
primarily useful in urban communities. The subdivided tract is shown
on what is called a plat, which is recorded with the county recorder.
Thereafter, the subdivider can convey the land with reference to the
plat—Lot One in Jones Addition to the City of Huntersville, and so
on. This process is simple and once the plat is recorded, the possibility
of error in land conveyancing is considerably less.
The next step in subdivision control was to recognize that when raw
land was subdivided, the community has an interest in seeing that certain
necessary standards are imposed on the developer to insure that the
development w ill take place in a proper way. At first, the standards
were what may be called quantitative; that is, they were related to
physically measurable requirements such as the width and paving of
streets, the provision of drainage facilities, setbacks, and lot sizes. W ith
hardly an exception, the courts have now recognized that these require
ments may properly be imposed on the subdivider, without compensation,
as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
In this metro-atomic age, however, many have begun to feel that
the restrictions and regulations applicable to land subdivisions should
take on a different character. Sometimes the phrase “qualitative control”
is used; that is, it is desired that the subdivision fit into the general
community structure in a way that w ill not be harmful to community
development. That is a lot of language and a very general statement.
Perhaps it w ill be more helpful if the subject is divided into three more
specific categories.
First, to isolate a preliminary difficulty, as subdivision regulations
have become more common and have grown tighter, difficulties have
occurred with evaders. A way must be found to handle the wildcatting
subdivider before thought can be given to tighter quality subdivision con
trols. Second, municipalities are beginning to recognize that new sub
divisions impose costs on the municipality which are very difficult if
not impossible to recoup by way of special assessment or by way of the
general property tax. Partly because of convenience, partly because of
a feeling that the subdivider should bear some of these costs, some
municipalities in some states have begun to impose lot fees on the sub
division of raw land.
Finally, much attention is being given to the placing of controls on
the wholesale subdivision of land itself. In particular, concern has been
voiced about the problem of timing in relation to subdivision develop
ment. Can we continue to afford the land wastage which occurs when
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subdividers leapfrog and pepperpot all over the fringe area of a munici
pality? Can one afford to let new subdivisions outrun the provision of
schools and other community services?
To borrow the atomic metaphor once more, each of the solutions
to these problems presents questions of legal limits which are similar
to the space limits which are presently faced by the astronauts. Not
all of the attempts to conquer outer space have been successful, and
not all of the attempts to deal with land space have been successful
either. They have run up against legal limitations which have been as
difficult as the limitations faced in space travel. The writer is convinced
that legally acceptable solutions w ill be found.
W hat about the builder who seeks to evade the subdivision regu
lations? How can this problem arise? To get an answer to this
question, the planning enabling statute must be examined. The general
statute, passed in 1947, which applies to most of the planning commissions
in the state of Indiana, provides (in § 53-745) that after a master plan
and subdivision ordinance have been adopted, no plan of a subdivision
shall be filed with the auditor or recorded with the recorder unless it
has first been approved by the plan commission. The trouble with this
section is twofold. It does not state that everybody must file for
approval with the plan commission before conveying property. Nor
does the section contain a definition of the word subdivision.
It is not intended that every individual who conveys land must first
obtain permission from the plan commission which has jurisdiction.
For example, certainly no permission would be required if the owner
of a farm wishes to convey that farm to a son or to another purchaser.
Nor would prior permission be necessary in other cases in which an
owner of farm land wishes to sell off part of it for farm purposes.
However, when raw land is split up for urban purposes, some action
should be taken by the plan commission to insure that the necessary
minimum requirements for urban living and urban design are met.
At the present time, since there is no definition of a subdivision and
since the approval of the plan commission is not required for conveyance,
the situation is this—a builder may in fact subdivide land and make a
plat. The approval of the plan commission is not necessary because
the subdivider simply may not record the plat and convey by metes-andbounds. In this manner, the law is evaded. In other words, there is
nothing to prevent the builder from drawing up a plat showing the
lots and then conveying, not with reference to the plat, but by the legal
description. Of course, there are various penalties contained in the
planning law which seek to prevent this from happening, but they are
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not strong enough, they have not been enforced often enough, and
therefore they do not really work.
As previously stated, the difficulty lies partly in the definition of
subdivision. The statute should perhaps indicate first of all what a
subdivision really is. Having done that, the law should indicate that
any person who subdivides w ill have to come to the plan commission
for approval and it should include a penalty sufficient to prevent the
subdivider from conveying land with reference to a plat without first
obtaining permission.
Taking the problem of subdivision definition first, it would be helpful
to refer to a recent California law. This law is typical of the laws in
many states which define subdivision as the division of land into a given
number of parcels during any one year. The California law states that
subdivision means the division of land by the subdivider into five or
more parcels within any one-year period. Perhaps the one danger with
this kind of definition is that the small builder who only sells off two
or three houses a year is left out of this law. So the law would be
tighter if subdivision were defined as the division of any one tract into
two or more tracts. The laws in some states are so written, and of
course this kind of definition is practically air tight. Any time land
is divided into two or more plots, then the subdivision regulations apply.
However, this kind of a regulation has other dangers. It does not,
in terms, exempt the selling off by a farmer of a certain part of property
for agricultural uses. One way to take care of this problem would be
to define the agricultural uses which would be exempt from the
subdivision law. Then, any conveyance for an agricultural use would
not be under the provisions of the ordinance. The trouble, of course,
with this definition is that it is very difficult to enforce. Not every
subdivision of land would come before the commission. The interpreta
tion of the exclusion would be left with the subdivider, and the plan
commission would have to find the violators.
The California law does not approach the exclusion problem in
this way. Two general exclusions are made from the planning require
ments. The first exclusion is any parcel of five acres or less which
abuts on an existing street, which does not require a street opening or
widening, and for which the lot design meets the approval of the govern
ing body. Notice that this is not a complete exemption from the sub
division law, but because the parcel abuts on an already existing street
or highway, the subdivider need only comply with the lot design
requirement of the governing body. The second exclusion from the
California law consists of those parcels of land of a net area of one acre
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or more for which a tentative map has been submitted to the governing
body and which have been approved as to street alignment, street width,
drainage, and lot design. Again note that the exemption is only partial.
Again the subdivision or lot must be submitted to the planning body
and again certain minimum requirements are imposed.
This approach is subject to question. Legitimate objections may be
raised as to the need for so comprehensive a definition as well as to
the necessity of including every division of land within the subdivision
regulations. In fact, the California exclusion provisions follow closely
the practice which has been adopted in some Indiana counties of re
quiring the subdivider who does not fall under the subdivision regulations
to file a petition for exclusion from the subdivision law. The writer
understands that this petition works in a way which is similar to the
method contemplated by the California statute. The subdivider need
only comply with certain minimum requirements of the subdivision
regulations and having so complied, is exempted from any further com
pliance. This particular practice has led to protests in some areas. It
is felt that the legal status of this regulation under existing law is
doubtful. The writer does not believe that there is explicit authority
to engage in this practice, and it is thought that if challenged in a court
suit, the practice might be held to be ultra vires—that is, beyond the
provisions of the enabling act. In the last legislature, a bill was intro
duced which would have forbidden this practice. It was drafted so
widely, however, that it would have thrown a very serious doubt on
the propriety of all subdivision regulations. This bill was not passed.
Perhaps the whole problem should be reconsidered with a thought to
the eventual clarifying legislation.
If a statute similar to the California law were adopted the question
of penalties would still have to be met. The writer feels that criminal
penalties and injunction provisions are of limited usefulness. Some
states have attempted other approaches to the matter with varying suc
cess; a few of these are presented for consideration. It is possible to
link the issuance of building permits to the subdivision regulations.
Under this approach, no building permit would be issued unless the
subdivision regulations had been complied with. A second approach is
to provide by law that a purchaser may set aside the sale of a piece of
property in a subdivision which has not been approved. This solution
would approach the problem of planning through the land title. It is
felt that this approach has real possibilities if the cooperation of the
real estate and banking professions can be obtained. For example, it
might be desirable to provide by law that no mortgage may validly be
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issued on land which is not in an approved subdivision. This would
be pretty stiff. But it might be a very helpful way of checking the
evader.
As an alternative, the laws might be tightened on the acceptance of
deeds for recording and it made very clear that the recorder is not
to accept any deed which is not in an approved subdivision. It could
then be made clear that a recorded deed in an unapproved subdivision
would be incapable of passing title to property. Perhaps the county
recorder is not the official to enforce the subdivision law, however. A
final approach which deserves mention is the “Blue Sky” approach. It
is known that the procedure in securities regulation is to let the issuer
market any security, but the financial background of the company
must be very carefully specified. A similar suggestion has been made
in planning circles. If the conveyance is in a subdivision which is not
in compliance with the subdivision law, it would be stamped or other
wise marked to indicate quite clearly to the purchaser that the lot is
in an unapproved subdivision and that the purchaser is subject to all
the penalties and costs which follow from making such a purchase.
The second development discussed herein is the lot fee. When
levied, these fees are used to provide for services which are difficult
to provide for by special assessment or by the general property tax. One
example would be recreational spaces and parks. Another example
would be schools. Still another example would be drainage facilities.
The difficulty, of course, is that new homes in residential areas create a
considerable demand for services on the municipality. It is common
knowledge that homes do not begin to pay in taxes for the benefits
which they require. One way out of this dilemma is to require the
subdivider to dedicate at least the land for parks and schools. It is
felt that there would be no difficulty with such a requirement as it
would probably be held to be reasonably incidental to and related to
the land subdivision regulations. Practical problems would arise, how
ever. W hat does a municipality do, for example, with the very small
subdivision of six lots? Obviously, in that case the subdivider cannot be
asked to dedicate part of the property. The municipality would
end up with a small strip of land which would be practically worthless
for park or any other purposes.
Furthermore, it usually happens that the drainage facilities or sewage
facilities which are needed for new subdivisions are not all located on
or near the subdivision. In many cases, they w ill consist of facilities
or mains which are located away from the subdivision area, but which
are nevertheless required because the subdivision has been built. In
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these cases it is very difficult to apportion costs. If one thinks solely
of dedication of land, for example, the subdivision which happens to
be close to the particular facility w ill have to dedicate. The subdivision
which is not close w ill not have to dedicate the land. The problem is
even more acute if the total cost of the facility is placed on the sub
division that happens to be nearby. Nor would use of the special
assessment procedure help. Special assessments can only be levied for
benefits received. For example, it is doubtful that a lot could be assessed
for a pumping facility located several miles away. One court has
recently voided an assessment of this type. An Indiana law exists which
permits the costs for a main sewer to be apportioned on a local and on
a wider, district basis. But the procedure is very cumbersome. Again,
one way out of this dilemma is to charge a lot fee.
During the past few years there have been several cases adjudicating
the status of the lot fee. Two of them were decided within the last
few months. In practically all of these cases, the decision of the court
was unfavorable. This is cautionary, but it is felt that this current of
authority should not lead to giving up attempts to levy a lot fee. It is
felt that the unfavorable judicial reaction is due in part to the fact
that the device is a new one. The courts are not used to it. They do
not know how to catalog it. They do not known how to deal with it.
As an original proposition, it would seem that if the municipality can
demand of a builder who has a large subdivision the donation of several
acres for playgrounds, then it can demand of a builder who has a small
subdivision the donation of an equivalent in the form of a money
payment.
Some of the courts have treated the question as one of vires—that
is, as a question of statutory authority. In an Oregon case which was
decided just this February, the county charged a lot fee of $37.50
which was to be used for park purposes. The approach of the court
was to hold that the lot fee was not authorized by the enabling legisla
tion. This legislation was in the usual form and it was similar to the
enabling legislation which exists in the state of Indiana. It provided,
for example, that the subdivision standards could take into account the
public health, safety, or general welfare of the community. However,
the court held that the statute did not authorize a fee or a tax but
simply authorized a regulation of land use. Consequently, the fee was
beyond the intent of the statute.
There was an alternate ground for the courts decision, and it presents
a very difficult question. The subdivider contended that the fee was a
revenue measure designed to produce money for public purposes, and,

260
therefore, was a tax which the county had not been authorized to levy.
The contention of the county appeared to be that the fee was simply
incidental to the regulation of subdivisions, and therefore was merely
secondary to an exercise of the police power. For example, if the county
had seen fit to levy a small fee to bear the cost of inspecting new
subdivisions, there would have been no difficulty with the case. In that
event, the fee would have been incidental to the subdivision regulation.
The court skipped away from this problem. It held that the
regulation “authorizes the county to lay a tax upon one class of landowners for a public purpose, which may be but need not be related to
the activity being regulated.” In other words, the contention of the
court was that there was no limitation on the area in which the money
could be spent, since the money could be spent for parks which were not
located near or which would not be used by the new homes. Therefore,
it was not related to the regulatory purpose.
A similar conclusion was reached by a lower California court in a
decision handed down a few years ago. Their subdivision enabling act
was more limited and only authorized regulations dealing with the
design and improvement of subdivisions. The court again held that the
statute did not authorize the levy of a fee. As in the Oregon case, the
money was to be used for park purposes and could be spent anywhere
in the area and not necessarily in the area in which the new homes
would be built.
A final and very interesting decision was handed down a couple
of years ago by the Supreme Court of Michigan. This case involved
the levy of a permit fee which was supposed to take care of the inci
dental police and other costs which were incurred in connection with
the building of new subdivisions. For example, the city alleged that
fires had to be put out while a subdivision was being built and that
during construction it had to be policed so that vandalism would not
occur. The purpose of this lot fee was to pay for the costs of policing
and otherwise taking care of the new subdivisions while they were being
built. Again, the issue was discussed in terms of whether or not this
was a tax which was not authorized or simply an incidental fee which
contributed to the regulatory police power. In this case, the amounts
raised by the fee were so great that they were out of proportion to the
costs which were incurred. The court held that the amount raised was
excessive and that the fee was not authorized to this extent. However,
they did say that it was permissible under the statute for the municipal
ity to levy a lot fee which would take care of the actual costs which
the city would have to incur in policing new subdivisions while they
were under construction.
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Attention is directed once more to a recent California statute which
seeks to clear up the problem raised by lot fees in that state. This
California statute now authorizes the levy of lot fees to defray the
actual or estimated costs of constructing what are termed planned
drainage facilities. The statute is quite detailed. One of the conditions
imposed is that the costs of the drainage facilities must be fairly ap
portioned throughout the drainage area either on the basis of benefits
conferred or on the need for facilities created by the proposed sub
divisions. Furthermore, the fee imposed must not exceed the amount
which would be imposed on the lots in the area if the assessment were
on a per acre basis rather than on an area basis.
This statute is very carefully drawn. It makes the legislative intent
very clear and an analogy might be drawn to a special assessment. In
other words, it could be claimed that this particular lot fee was not a
tax but was in the nature of a special assessment. A special assessment
need not meet the constitutional rules as to uniformity of taxation, but
the special assessment, on the other hand, can only be levied for benefits
conferred. The difficulty with the special assessment analogy in this case
is that no notice or hearing provisions are provided, as the California
legislature has definitely tied the fee in with the subdivision regulation
process. To the w riter’s knowledge, this statute has not been tested.
It is believed that it would be quite helpful if here in Indiana some
thought were given to legislation of this type and to possible ways in
which lot fees could be levied on subdividers to help defray the cost of
the facilities which new subdivisions require.
Finally, it was indicated that something was to be said about the
planning of new development in fringe areas. M any are worried by
the fact that new development often outstrips the provision of new
community facilities. There is also worry about the fact that new
developments seem to hop, skip, and jump all over the countryside
without any relationship to facilities that are offered or that might be
offered within a reasonable period of time. The solution to this prob
lem has, so far, been indirect and communities have, so far, proceeded
under zoning ordinances rather than under the subdivision regulations.
For example, one approach has been to provide for acre zoning in the
fringe areas. Lots are zoned so as to require five, six, or ten acres
per house. This w ill obviously discourage the large scale subdivision
and w ill thereby prevent the building of houses which w ill require
new services and facilities in advance of demand.
W hat about a direct approach to the timing problem? In one
recent case, a small New York town enacted a regulation which pro
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vided that when taking into consideration the granting of a permit for
a subdivision, the municipality could consider whether or not the
existing community facilities were adequate. A subdivider applied
for a permit to double the permitted density requirements. The muni
cipality found that existing school facilities were inadequate and there
fore rejected the application. In this case, the regulation was upheld as
it was found to be within the terms of the enabling statute and was
found not to have exceeded the limits of the police power.
Other more direct methods have not fared so well in the New
York courts. One small New York town passed an ordinance which
provided that the building of homes was a business. They then sought
to license this business of building homes and they took care of the
problem of new homes by restricting the number of licenses in any
one year and thereby the number of homes that were built. This
ordinance was thrown out as being unauthorized by the statute because,
said the court, it was an attempt to impose a subdivision regulation in
the guise of a licensing provision. Since the municipality does not have
the statutory power to license, the regulation could not stand.
These cases highlight the familiar fact that suburban communities
in a metropolitan area usually are not anxious to take on new hous
ing. If they accept anything at all, it w ill not be a large-scale sub
division which generates a lot of children and thus a need for schools
and other facilities. To a certain extent, these suburban municipalities
cannot be blamed for this attitude. It has been noted earlier that new
residential subdivisions cannot pay their own way and have generated
a greater demand for services than the taxes which are paid on the
property. Furthermore, under present planning laws the suburban
municipalities have no way of deciding just when and just where the
new subdivisions w ill be built. Fortunately, in Indiana ample and
adequate legislation exists which provides for planning and zoning on
a metropolitan basis as is presently being done in Marion county and
other counties. When planning is projected on a metropolitan level,
some of the problems which arise because of competing municipal needs
and desires do not develop.
Even within a metropolitan framework, some attention w ill have
to be given to the question of regulating the tempo, timing, and sequence
of new residential development. One approach is that taken by the
New York municipality already discussed which regulated the density
of new subdivisions according to the availability of community services.
Another approach would be for the subdivision ordinance to set up a
priority system for the use of land. The planning department would
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then decide which vacant areas would be used first, which second,
which third, etc. The provision of new schools, new parks, and other
community facilities could then be geared to the building of housing. A
question then arises as to whether the planning and zoning enabling act
in Indiana is broad enough to permit this kind of priority zoning.
One case came up in Connecticut which involved the attempt of a
small town near New Haven to engage in subdivision regulation of
this type. In this case the municipality turned down the subdivision
because it was found that additional housing would impose a financial
burden on the community. As in the New York case, findings were
based on the absence of school facilities. Contrary to the New York
court, however, the Connecticut court held that the enabling act did
not authorize a refusal for this reason. Because the planning and
enabling legislation did not speak directly to the problem of timing,
sequence, and need, the Connecticut court is probably correct.
There is a technical distinction between the New York and Con
necticut cases, however, which is very important and which probably
explains why the courts reached different results. In the New York
case the town did not attempt to prohibit the subdivision entirely.
In that case the town simply refused to lower the density requirements.
The ordinance called for building lots of 40,000 square feet and the
builder wanted a special permit which would have authorized building
at a density of 22,500 square feet. In other words, the density would
almost have doubled. Since the enabling act speaks directly to the ques
tion of density and explicitly authorizes municipalities to regulate density
when passing subdivision ordinances, the New York case is probably
correct. Because the enabling acts do not give explicit authority to reject
outright an application for a new subdivision because of need, the Con
necticut court is also probably correct.
In the course of this discussion some court opinions have been
reviewed which in many cases have been unfavorable to the kinds of
subdivision regulations presented in this paper. In the opinion of the
writer, these unfavorable court opinions do not necessarily reflect judicial
antagonism to this kind of subdivision control. Instead, it seems that
the unfavorable court decisions simply reflect a growing tension in the
administration and in the operation of subdivision requirements. W e
are, for the most part, operating under enabling acts which were drafted
and enacted in the 1920s. Municipalities operating in the 1960s now
see problems of land-use control which were never thought about in
the 1920s. These municipalities attempt by one device or another to
work out regulations and ordinances which fit into the statutory scheme
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of the 1920s and which w ill still permit them to handle the new problems
which have arisen. M any times, however, the statutory scheme is inade
quate. In many of the cases which have been discussed and which have
reached unfavorable conclusions, the basis for the decision was not
necessarily that the ordinance passed or the regulation enacted was un
constitutional but that there was no statutory authority for the municipal
action which was taken.
Where does all of this lead ? Several problems have been briefly
reviewed in the operation and administration of subdivision controls.
New problems have arisen even before the basic essentials of subdivision
control have been fully assimilated, and even before some municipalities
and many counties have enacted the necessary basic regulations. It has
been seen that in many cases the wildcatting builder manages to evade
the subdivision laws because of a technicality in draftsmanship. It has
been seen that existing provisions for the dedication of land and levy of
assessments for public improvements are inadequate and that municipali
ties in some areas of the country are experimenting with lot fees in
order to raise the necessary additional funds. Finally, it has been seen
that in some cases, the municipality has regulated the tempo, sequence,
and timing of new development in order that new housing w ill not
outstrip the provision of community facilities and in order that de
velopment w ill take place in an orderly fashion.
W hat is needed now is a wholesale rethinking of the aims and the
purposes of subdivision control. The provisions which define a subdivi
sion and the scope of the subdivision regulations need to be tightened.
New and more adequate techniques of local government finance are
needed. Finally, more attention must be given to the shape and form
of communities in order to prevent land wastage and in order to insure
that all citizens are able to enjoy adequate community facilities. These
are just some of the problems which planning, zoning, and subdivision
regulation must face in the new, metro-atomic age.

